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 LAW REVIEW SYMPOSIUM 2010: 
GOVERNMENT SPEECH:  
THE GOVERNMENT’S ABILITY TO 
COMPEL AND RESTRICT SPEECH  
INTRODUCTION:  
GOVERNMENT SPEECH 
B. Jessie Hill† 
“Government speech” is as protean a concept as any in 
constitutional law.1 Justice Stevens’s description of the term as 
“recently minted” in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum 
notwithstanding,2 government speech in fact has a relatively long 
pedigree.3 Yet that pedigree has not remained pure; instead, the 
government speech concept has become entwined with multiple lines 
of constitutional doctrine.4  
                                                                                                                 
†  Professor and Associate Director of the Center for Social Justice, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. 
1 In The Many Faces of Government Speech, for example, Professors Randall Bezanson 
and William Buss identify eight “typologies” of government speech. Randall P. Bezanson & 
William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1384–87 
(2001). Much earlier, Professor Steven Shiffrin characterized government speech as including 
“state support of communications ranging from official government messages, to statements by 
public officials at publicly subsidized press conferences or in letters mailed at taxpayers’ 
expense, to the speech of political candidates and artists supported by government political or 
artistic subsidies, to the publicly financed editorializing of broadcasters and public school 
newspapers, to the communications of public school teachers, and even to the speech supported 
by second class mail privileges that once operated as a generous subsidy to periodicals.” Steven 
Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 565 n.* (1980). 
2 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
3 In his classic article on the subject, Shiffrin notes that Professor Mark Yudof had begun 
exploring the topic in a 1977 lecture. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 569 n.19. This exploration led 
ultimately to Yudof’s important book, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND 
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983). 
4 Though the concept of government speech primarily has relevance in the realm of First 
Amendment doctrine—including both free speech and the religion clauses—some recent 
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Generalization is therefore difficult. But at a minimum, perhaps, 
one can fairly state that “government speech” refers to a wide range 
of phenomena in which, rather than regulating private speakers’ 
messages, the government controls or supports a particular message 
using any of a panoply of carrots (such as funding or special access to 
government property) or sticks (such as denial of funding or 
exclusion from government property. The speech may originate with 
the government itself or with a private individual, but the government 
must control or support the message in some way.5 As the array of 
papers in this symposium demonstrates, government speech may 
manifest itself in a variety of ways. It may include government-
sponsored religious displays, whether those displays were originally 
designed by governmental actors or donated by private entities.6 It 
may include “platforms” for private speech, like monuments or 
fellowship funding, where the government broadly approves but does 
not micromanage the specific message conveyed.7 It also includes 
most of the things that public employees say in the course of their 
employment.8 Less obviously and more troublingly, it may include 
every message conveyed—whether by state or private actors—at 
government-sponsored public functions and in public school 
curricular and extracurricular settings.9 The argument might even be 
                                                                                                                 
 
commentary has extended government speech into other realms, such as equal protection under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See William M. Carter, Jr., Affirmative Action as Government 
Speech, 59 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1760192.  
 5 See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment 
Clause, 85 TUL. L. REV. 571, 575 (2011) (arguing that “‘effective control’ over speech is the 
primary distinguishing factor in assigning responsibility for speech” as governmental or 
private). Of course, the category of government-sponsored speech is not necessarily a clear-cut 
or stable one. Professor Caroline Corbin has thus proposed a category of “mixed speech” for 
speech that cannot clearly be characterized as governmental or private. Caroline Mala Corbin, 
Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 607 
(2008). 
6 See, e.g., Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132–34; Mary Jean Dolan, The Cross National 
Memorial: At the Intersection of Speech and Religion, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1171 (2011); 
Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored Religious Displays: Transparent Rationalizations 
and Expedient Post-Modernism, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1211 (2011). 
7 See Abner S. Greene, Speech Platforms, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1253 (2011) 
[hereinafter Greene, Speech Platforms]. 
8 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–43 (2006); see also Helen Norton, 
Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect 
Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 30–40 (2009) (discussing the applicability of government 
speech doctrine to public employees’ speech). 
9 Helen Norton, Imaginary Threats to Government’s Expressive Interests, 61 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1265 (2011). 
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made that attorneys working in public law school clinics, in their 
capacity as public employees, are engaging in government speech.10 
In most cases, the label of government speech has functioned as a 
defense to an opposing claim of free speech rights. If the government 
is trying to express its own message, the doctrine holds, then it has 
leeway to exclude or discriminate against private messages in any 
way it sees fit; the government, as speaker, is not subject to the same 
constraints against content- and viewpoint-based discrimination as 
when it acts as regulator of private speech. No government could do 
its job, after all, if it had to provide a podium for opposing views 
whenever it expressed its own views on matters like foreign policy or 
public health According to a classic example, if the government erects 
a Statue of Liberty, surely the First Amendment’s prohibition on 
viewpoint discrimination does not require it to permit construction of 
a Statue of Autocracy as well.11 The government may, and indeed 
must, exercise dominion over its own message. Indeed, some amount 
of government speech may in fact be desirable, as it enhances the 
transparency of government actions and the reasons behind those 
actions, thus leading to greater accountability for government actors.12 
Yet like all claims of dominion, the category of government 
speech has a tendency to expand. Scholars have thus largely 
responded with skepticism to the recent expansion of government 
speech.13 Professor Helen Norton’s contribution to this symposium 
demonstrates the dramatic expansion in the lower courts of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos,14 holding that 
speech by government employees, even on matters of public concern, 
was unprotected by the First Amendment when the speech was part of 
the employee’s official duties.15 Courts have applied Garcetti’s 
government speech rationale in order to exclude dissenting speakers 
from public functions and to punish legitimate and useful student 
speech in public schools, although those cases are a far cry from 
vindicating the doctrine’s goal of furthering, rather than inhibiting, 
public accountability.16  
                                                                                                                 
10 See generally Margaret Tarkington, Government Speech and the Publicly Employed 
Attorney, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2175 (briefly outlining and then refuting the argument).  
11 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138. 
12 Norton, supra note 8, at 20–23. 
13 This tone of skepticism is aptly demonstrated by the title of Professor Steven G. Gey’s 
2010 article on the subject. Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect 
Government Speech When the Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259 (2010). 
14 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
15 Norton, supra note 9, at 1267–68. 
16 Id. at 1269–74. 
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Similarly, in the case of law school clinics, Professor Peter Joy’s 
and Professor Adam Babich’s articles describe striking examples of 
the extent to which legislators seem willing to assert a right to control 
clinic attorneys’ and law students’ speech in order to “de-lawyer” 
indigent clients.17 Indeed, in the case of Tulane Law School, the 
legislature sought to control the speech of a private law school clinic, 
which received minimal state funding, on the flimsy and specious 
justification of protecting the state’s economic interests.18  
Though the label of government speech may not be appropriate for 
the activities of law school clinics, it nonetheless seems clear that the 
First Amendment provides few safeguards against such interference. 
Moreover, as Professor Jonathan Entin’s article demonstrates, 
governmental interference with speech aimed at law reform—and 
especially with entities that sue the government or other powerful 
interests—is nothing new.19 New solutions and approaches are 
therefore required. Professors Entin, Babich, and Joy heed this call in 
a most valuable way, by considering what legal or other remedies 
might in fact exist. In his thought-provoking essay, Professor Entin 
suggests that the ideal of academic freedom, while largely lacking in 
legal teeth, might nonetheless informally constrain both state and 
non-state actors as a “powerful intellectual and social norm.”20 
Professor Babich takes a highly original tack, exploring the 
possibility that the preemption doctrine might protect against de-
lawyering strategies in the environmental law realm.21 And Professor 
Joy’s thoughtful overview of legal responses to attacks on clinics 
suggests that the equal protection doctrine, legal ethics regulations, 
separation-of-powers doctrine, and even—in certain limited 
circumstances—the right to free speech may provide some small 
measure of protection.22 
Moreover, for better or for worse, when the government speaks, it 
mostly says what it thinks we want to hear. In other words, 
government speech appears to gravitate toward expressing 
majoritarian viewpoints. For Professor Abner Greene, this tendency is 
not necessarily a bad thing. He argues in his excellent contribution to 
                                                                                                                 
17 Adam Babich, De-Lawyering Legislation and Environmental Law Clinics: Can the 
Preemption Doctrine Protect Public Participation Rights?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1109 
(2011); Peter A. Joy, Government Interference with Law School Clinics and Access to Justice: 
When Is There a Legal Remedy?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1087 (2011). 
18  Babich, supra note 17, at 1116–23. 
19 Jonathan L. Entin, Law School Clinics and the First Amendment, 61 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 1153 (2011). 
20 Id. at 1169. 
21 Babich, supra note 17. 
22 Joy, supra note 17. 
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this symposium that “[t]he state should . . . have the power to refuse 
to open platforms to speech that offends core, commonly held values 
grounded in our commitment to the equal protection of the laws”—
such as hate speech or vulgarity.23 But state sponsorship of speech 
platforms does not justify every sort of content-based judgment, even 
in Professor Greene’s view. The state should avoid taking sides with 
respect to contested issues, for example, and it should not sponsor 
speech that denigrates people on the basis of race or other illegitimate 
traits.24  
When government speech is religious, however, its majoritarian 
quality appears more troubling. As Professor Douglas Laycock’s 
contribution incisively demonstrates, many legal opinions upholding 
the constitutionality of transparently religious monuments endorsing 
Christianity engage in manipulation and recharacterization in order to 
avoid acknowledging the obviously sectarian nature of the display.25 
Moreover, according to Professor Laycock, government’s attempts to 
distance itself from such speech should be rejected: it is usually a fair 
assumption that the government agrees with the content of the sign it 
erects, absent any clear indication to the contrary.26 Taking these 
displays at “face value,” Professor Laycock argues, would lead to the 
conclusion that “government display of a sacred text presumptively 
endorses the religious message in that text, and the burden is on the 
government to clearly rebut the presumption of endorsement with 
[sufficiently clear] objective evidence.”27  
Similarly, Professor Mary Jean Dolan’s original and illuminating 
contribution considers how the recent expansion of government 
speech doctrine to include what she refers to as “identity” messages 
has led to greater collision with Establishment Clause principles.28 
Using the hypothetical case of a congressional choice to maintain the 
National Memorial status of the Mojave desert cross challenged in 
Salazar v. Buono29 while refusing that status to proposed alternative 
memorials, Professor Dolan highlights the point at which such 
majoritarian religious speech becomes problematic—the point at 
                                                                                                                 
23 Greene, supra note 7, at 1257–58; cf. Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (arguing that “government in a liberal democracy not only may 
promote contested views of the good, but should do so, as well,” including by way of its own 
speech). 
24 Greene, Speech Platforms, supra note 7, at 1258–59.  
25 Laycock, supra note 6. 
26 Id. at 1252. 
27 Id. at 1249; cf. B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic 
Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 539–44 (2005) (arguing for a 
presumption against religious symbols on government property). 
28 Dolan, supra note 6. 
29  130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
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which it becomes a “claim that the Christian symbol better represents 
the national identity—or (and perhaps even worse) that is more 
consistent with the image the government administration seeks to 
present.”30  
The multifaceted problem of government speech clearly provides 
rich fodder for reflection, as the wide array of articles in this 
fascinating and timely symposium demonstrates. The esteemed group 
of panelists produced an exhilarating day of discussion as well as this 
excellent and useful selection of papers. Much credit goes to them 
and to the student editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review, 
together with their faculty advisor, Professor Jonathan Entin, for a 
valuable addition to the burgeoning scholarship on government 
speech. Indeed, the government speech doctrine, and the questions it 
raises, will likely be with us for some time. 
 
                                                                                                                 
30 Dolan, supra note 6, at 1210. 
